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ABSTRACT
Trust is a fundamental concept in many real-world applications
such as e-commerce and peer-to-peer networks. In these appli-
cations, users can generate local opinions about the counterparts
based on direct experiences, and these opinions can then be aggre-
gated to build trust among unknown users. The mechanism to build
new trust relationships based on existing ones is referred to as trust
inference. State-of-the-art trust inference approaches employ the
transitivity property of trust by propagating trust along connected
users. In this paper, we propose a novel trust inference model (Ma-
Trust) by exploring an equally important property of trust, i.e., the
multi-aspect property. MaTrust directly characterizes multiple la-
tent factors for each trustor and trustee from the locally-generated
trust relationships. Furthermore, it can naturally incorporate prior
knowledge as specified factors. These factors in turn serve as the
basis to infer the unseen trustworthiness scores. Experimental eval-
uations on real data sets show that the proposed MaTrust signif-
icantly outperforms several benchmark trust inference models in
both effectiveness and efficiency.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database applications—Data min-
ing
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation
Keywords
Trust inference, transitivity property, multi-aspect property, latent
factors, prior knowledge
1. INTRODUCTION
Trust is essential to reduce uncertainty and boost collaborations
in many real-world applications including e-commerce [10], peer-
to-peer networks [11], semantic Web [25], etc. In these applica-
tions, trust inference is widely used as the mechanism to build trust
among unknown users. Typically, trust inference takes as input the
existing trust ratings locally generated through direct interactions,
and outputs an estimated trustworthiness score from a trustor to an
unknown trustee. This trustworthiness score indicates to what de-
gree the trustor could expect the trustee to perform a given action.
The basic assumption behind most of the existing trust inference
methods is the transitivity property of trust [17], which basically
means that if Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Carol, Alice might
also trust Carol to some extent. These methods (see Section 2 for
a review), referred to as trust propagation models as a whole, have
been widely studied and successfully applied in many real-world
settings [7, 36, 17, 13, 8, 20].
In addition to transitivity, a few trust inference models explore
another equally important property, the multi-aspect of trust [5,
27]. The basic assumption behind the multi-aspect methods is that
trust is the composition of multiple factors, and different users may
have different preferences for these factors. For example, in e-
commerce, some users might care more about the factor of deliv-
ering time, whereas others give more weight to the factor of prod-
uct price. However, the existing multi-aspect trust inference meth-
ods [26, 34, 30, 28] require as input more information (e.g., the
delivering time as well as user’s preference for it) in addition to
locally-generated trust ratings, and therefore become infeasible in
many trust networks where such information is not available.
Another limitation in existing trust inference models is that they
tend to ignore some important prior knowledge during the inference
procedure. In social science community, it is commonly known that
trust bias is an integrated part in the final trust decision [29]. There-
fore, it would be helpful if we can incorporate such prior knowledge
into the trust inference model. In computer science community, re-
searchers begin to realize the importance of trust bias, and a recent
work [21] models trustor bias as the propensity of a trustor to trust
others.
In this paper, we focus on improving the trust inference accuracy
by integrating the multi-aspect property and trust bias together, and
the result is the proposed trust inference model MaTrust. Different
from the existing multi-aspect trust inference methods, MaTrust
directly characterizes multiple latent factors for each trustor and
trustee from existing trust ratings. In addition, MaTrust can natu-
rally incorporate the priori knowledge (e.g., trust bias) as several
specified factors. In particular, we consider three types of trust
bias, i.e., global bias, trustor bias, and trustee bias. We will re-
fer to the characterized latent and specified factors as stereotypes
in the following. Finally, the characterized stereotypes are in turn
used to estimate the trust ratings between unknown users. Com-
pared with the existing multi-aspect methods, the proposed method
is more general since it does not require any information as in-
put other than the locally-generated trust ratings. Compared with
the trust propagation methods, our experimental evaluations on real
data sets indicate that the proposed MaTrust is significantly better
in both effectiveness and efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
related work. Section 3 presents the definition of the trust infer-
ence problem. Section 4 describes our optimization formulation
for the problem defined in the previous section and shows how to
incorporate the priori knowledge. Section 5 presents the inference
algorithm to solve the formulation. Section 6 provides experimen-
tal results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce related trust inference models includ-
ing trust propagation models, multi-aspect trust inference models,
and other related methods.
2.1 Trust Propagation Models
To date, a large body of trust inference models are based on trust
propagation where trust is propagated along connected users in the
trust network, i.e., the web of locally-generated trust ratings. Based
on the interpretation of trust propagation, we further categorize
these models into two classes: path interpretation and component
interpretation.
In the first category of path interpretation, trust is propagated along
a path from the trustor to the trustee, and the propagated trust from
multiple paths can be combined to form a final trustworthiness
score. For example, Wang and Singh [31, 32] as well as Hang
et al. [8] propose operators to concatenate trust along a path and
aggregate trust from multiple paths. Liu et al. [16] argue that not
only trust values but social relationships and recommendation role
are important for trust inference. In contrast, there is no explicit
concept of paths in the second category of component interpreta-
tion. Instead, trust is treated as random walks on a graph or on a
Markov chain [25]. Examples of this category include [7, 20, 36,
13, 23].
Different from these existing trust propagation models, the pro-
posed MaTrust focuses on the multi-aspect of trust and directly
characterizes several factors/aspects from the existing trust ratings.
Compared with trust propagation models, our MaTrust has several
unique advantages, including (1) multi-aspect property of trust can
be captured; and (2) various types of prior knowledge can be nat-
urally incorporated. In addition, one known problem about these
propagation models is the slow on-line response speed [35], while
MaTrust enjoys the constant on-line response time and the linear
scalability for pre-computation.
2.2 Multi-Aspect Trust Inference Models
Researchers in social science have explored the multi-aspect prop-
erty of trust for several years [27]. In computer science, there also
exist a few trust inference models that explicitly explore the multi-
aspect property of trust. For example, Xiong and Liu [34] model
the value of the transaction in trust inference; Wang and Wu [30]
take competence and honesty into consideration; Tang et al. [28]
model aspect as a set of products that are similar to each other un-
der product review sites; Sabater and Sierra [26] divide trust in e-
commerce environment into three aspects: price, delivering time,
and quality.
However, all these existing multi-aspect trust inference methods re-
quire more information (e.g., value of transaction as well as user’s
preference for it, product and its category, etc.) and therefore be-
come infeasible when such information is not available. In contrast,
MaTrust does not require any information other than the locally-
generated trust ratings, and could therefore be used in more general
scenarios.
In terms of trust bias, Mishra et al. [21] propose an iterative al-
gorithm to compute trustor bias. In contrast, our focus is to in-
corporate various types of trust bias as specified factors/aspects to
increase the accuracy of trust inference.
2.3 Other Related Methods
Recently, researchers begin to apply machine learning models for
trust inference. Nguyen et al. [22] learn the importance of several
trust-related features derived from a social trust framework. Our
method takes a further step here by simultaneously learning the la-
tent factors and the importance of bias. Seemingly similar concept
of stereotype for trust inference is also used by Liu et al. [18] and
Burnett et al. [3]. These methods learn the stereotypes from the user
profiles of the trustees that the trustor has interacted with, and then
use these stereotypes to reflect the trustor’s first impression about
unknown trustees. In contrast, MaTrust builds its stereotypes based
on the existing trust ratings to capture multiple aspects for trust in-
ference. There are also some recent work on using link prediction
approaches to predict the binary trust/distrust relationship [14, 4,
9]. In this paper, we focus on the more general case where we want
to infer a continuous trustworthiness score from the trustor to the
trustee.
Finally, multi-aspect methods have been extensively studied in rec-
ommender systems [1, 12, 19]. In terms of methodology, the clos-
est related work is the collaborative filtering algorithm in [12], which
can be viewed as a special case of the proposed MaTrust. As men-
tioned before, our MaTrust is more general by learning the optimal
weights for the prior knowledge and it leads to further performance
improvement. On the application side, the goal of recommender
systems is to predict users’ flavors of items. It is interesting to point
out that (1) on one hand, trust between users could help to predict
the flavors as we may give more weight to the recommendations
provided by trusted users; (2) on the other hand, trust itself might
be affected by the similarity of flavors since users usually trust oth-
ers with a similar taste [6]. Although out of the scope of this paper,
using recommendation to further improve trust inference accuracy
might be an interesting topic for future work.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we formally define our multi-aspect trust inference
problem. Table 1 lists the main symbols we use throughout the
paper.
Following conventions, we use bold capital letters for matrices, and
bold lower case letters for vectors. For example, we use a par-
tially observed matrix T to model the locally-generated trust rela-
tionships, where the existing/observed trust relationships are repre-
sented as non-zero trust ratings and non-existing/unobserved rela-
tionships are represented as ‘?’. As for the observed trust rating,
we represent it as a real number between 0 and 1 (a higher rating
Table 1: Symbols.
Symbol Definition and Description
T the partially observed trust matrix
F the characterized trustor matrix
G the characterized trustee matrix
F0 the sub-matrix of F for latent factors
G0 the sub-matrix of G for latent factors
T′ the transpose of matrix T
T(i, j) the element at the ith row and jth column
of matrix T
T(i, :) the ith row of matrix T
T(i, :)′ the transpose of vector T(i, :)
K the set of observed trustor-trustee pairs in T
µ the global bias
x the vector of trustor bias
y the vector of trustee bias
x(i) the ith element of vector x
n the number of users
c the number of specified factors
r the number of latent factors
s the number of all factors, s = c + r
α1, α2, α3 the coefficients for specified factors
u the trustor
v the trustee
m1,m2 the maximum iteration number
ξ1, ξ2 the threshold to stop the iteration
means more trustworthiness). We use calligraphic font K to denote
the set of observed trustor-trustee indices in T. Similar to Matlab,
we also denote the ith row of matrix T as T(i, :), and the transpose
of a matrix with a prime. In addition, we denote the number of
users as n and the number of characterized factors as s. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the goal of our trust model is to
infer the unseen trust relationship from the user u to another user v,
where u is the trustor and v is the unknown trustee to u.
Based on these notations, we first define the basic trust inference
problem as follows:
PROBLEM 1. The Basic Trust Inference Problem
Given: an n × n partially observed trust matrix T, a trustor u, and
a trustee v, where 1 6 u, v 6 n (u , v) and T(u, v) = ‘?’;
Find: the estimated trustworthiness score ˆT(u, v).
In the above problem definition, given a trustor-trustee pair, the
only information we need as input is the locally-generated trust rat-
ings (i.e., the partially observed matrix T). The goal of trust infer-
ence is to infer the new trust ratings (i.e., unseen/unobserved trust-
worthiness scores in the partially observed matrix T) by collecting
the knowledge from existing trust relationships. In this paper, we
assume that we can access such existing trust relationships. For
instance, these relationships could be collected by central servers
in a centralized environment like eBay, or by individuals in a dis-
tributed environment like EigenTrust [11]. How to collect these
trust relationships is out of the scope of this work.
In this paper, we propose a multi-aspect model for such trust in-
ference in Problem 1. That is, we want to infer an n × s trustor
matrix F whose element indicates to what extent the corresponding
person trusts others wrt a specific aspect/factor. Similarly, we want
to infer another n × s trustee matrix G whose element indicates
to what extent the corresponding person is trusted by others wrt a
specific aspect/factor. Such trustor and trustee matrices are in turn
used to infer the unseen trustworthiness scores. Based on the basic
trust inference problem, we define the multi-aspect trust inference
problem under MaTrust as follows:
PROBLEM 2. The MaTrust Trust Inference Problem
Given: an n × n partially observed trust matrix T, the number of
factors s, a trustor u, and a trustee v, where 1 6 u, v 6 n
(u , v) and T(u, v) = ‘?’;
Find: (1) an n × s trustor matrix F and an n × s trustee matrix G;
(2) the estimated trustworthiness score ˆT(u, v).
3.1 An Illustrative Example
To further illustrate our MaTrust trust inference problem (Prob-
lem 2), we give an intuitive example as shown in Fig. 1.
In this example, we observe several locally-generated pair-wise
trust relationships between five users (e.g., ‘Alice’, ‘Bob’, ‘Carol’,
‘David’, and ‘Elva’) as shown in Fig. 1(a). Each observation con-
tains a trustor, a trustee, and a numerical trust rating from the trustor
to the trustee. We then model these observations as a 5× 5 partially
observed matrix T (see Fig. 1(b)) where T(i, j) is the trust rating
from the ith user to the jth user if the rating is observed and T(i, j) =
‘?’ otherwise. Notice that we do not consider self-ratings and thus
represent the diagonal elements of T as ‘/’. By setting the number
of factors s = 2, our goal is to infer two 5 × 2 matrices F and G
(see Fig. 1(c)) from the input matrix T. Each row of the two matri-
ces is the stereotype for the corresponding user, and each column
of the matrices represents a certain aspect/factor in trust inference
(e.g., ‘delivering time’, ‘product price’, etc). For example, we can
see that Alice trusts others strongly wrt both ‘delivering time’ and
‘product price’ (based on matrix F), and she is in turn moderately
trusted by others wrt these two factors (based on matrix G). On
the other hand, both Bob and Carol put more emphasis on the de-
livering time, while David and Elva care more about the product
price.
Once F and G are inferred, we can use these two matrices to es-
timate the unseen trustworthiness scores (i.e., the ‘?’ elements in
T). For instance, the trustworthiness from Carol to Alice can be
estimated as ˆT(3, 1) = F(3, :)G(1, :)′ = 0.5. This estimation is
reasonable because Carol has the same stereotype as Bob and the
trustworthiness score from Bob to Alice is also 0.5. As another
example, David and Elva have similar preferences (i.e., the same
stereotypes), and thus we conjecture that they would trust each
other (i.e., ˆT(4, 5) = F(4, :)G(5, :)′ = 1). In the rest of the paper,
we will mainly focus on how to characterize F and G from the par-
tially observed input matrix T.
4. THE PROPOSED OPTIMIZATION FOR-
MULATION
In this section, we present our optimization formulation for the
problem defined in the previous section. We start with the basic
form, and then show how to incorporate the trust bias as specified
factors followed by its equivalent formulation. Finally, we discuss
some generalizations of our formulation.
Trustor Trustee Rating 
Alice Bob 1 
Alice Carol 1 
Alice David 1 
Alice Elva 1 
Bob Alice 0.5 
Bob Carol 1 
Carol Bob 1 
David Alice 0.5 
Elva Alice 0.5 
Elva David 1 
 
(a) The observed locally-
generated pair-wise trust
relationships
T =  
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
/1??5.0
?/??5.0
??/1?
??1/5.0
1111/ Alice 
Bob 
Carol 
David 
Elva 
trustors 
trustees 
(b) The partially observed trust matrix T
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(c) The inferred trustor matrix F and trustee matrix G
Figure 1: An illustrative example for MaTrust.
4.1 The Basic Formulation
Formally, Problem 2 can be formulated as the following optimiza-
tion problem:
min
F,G
∑
(i, j)∈K
(T(i, j) − F(i, :)G( j, :)′)2 + λ||F||2f ro + λ||G||2f ro (1)
where λ is a regularization parameter; ||F|| f ro and ||G|| f ro are the
Frobenious norm of the trustor and trustee matrices, respectively.
By this formulation, MaTrust aims to minimize the squared error
on the set of observed trust ratings. Notice that in Eq. (1), we have
two additional regularization terms (||F||2f ro and ||G||2f ro) to improve
the solution stability. The parameter λ ≥ 0 controls the amount of
such regularizations. Based on the resulting F and G of the above
equation, the unseen trustworthiness score ˆT(u, v) can then be esti-
mated by the corresponding stereotypes F(u, :) and G(v, :) as:
ˆT(u, v) = F(u, :)G(v, :)′ (2)
4.2 Incorporating Bias
The above formulation can naturally incorporate some prior knowl-
edge such as trust bias into the inference procedure. In this paper,
we explicitly consider the following three types of trust bias: global
bias, trustor bias, and trustee bias, although other types of bias can
be incorporated in a similar way.
• The global bias represents the average level of trust in the
community. The intuition behind this is that users tend to
rate optimistically in some reciprocal environments (e.g., e-
Commerce [24]) while they are more conservative in others
(e.g., security-related applications). As a result, it might be
useful to take such global bias into account and we model it
as a scalar µ.
• The trustor bias is based on the observation that some trustors
tend to generously give higher trust ratings than others. This
bias reflects the propensity of a given trustor to trust others,
and it may vary a lot among different trustors. Accordingly,
we can model the trustor bias as vector x with x(i) indicating
the trust propensity of the ith trustor.
• The third type of bias (trustee bias) aims to characterize the
fact that some trustees might have relatively higher capability
in terms of being trusted than others. Similar to the second
type of bias, we model this type of bias as vector y, where
y( j) indicates the overall capability of the jth trustee com-
pared to the average.
Each of these three types of bias can be represented as a specified
factor for our MaTrust model, respectively. By incorporating such
bias into Eq. (1), we have the following formulation:
min
F,G
∑
(i, j)∈K
(T(i, j) − F(i, :)G( j, :)′)2 + λ||F||2f ro + λ||G||2f ro
Subject to: F(:, 1) = µ1, G(:, 1) = α11 (global bias)
F(:, 2) = x, G(:, 2) = α21 (trustor bias)
F(:, 3) = α31, G(:, 3) = y (trustee bias) (3)
where α1, α2, and α3 are the weights of bias that we need to estimate
based on the existing trust ratings.
In addition to these three specified factors, we refer to the remaining
factors in the trustor and trustee matrices as latent factors. To this
end, we define two n × r sub-matrices of F and G for the latent
factors. That is, we define F0 = F(:, 4 : s) and G0 = G(:, 4 : s),
where each column of F0 and G0 corresponds to one latent factor
and r is the number of latent factors. With this notation, we have
the following equivalent form of Eq. (3):
min
F0 ,G0,α1 ,α2 ,α3
∑
(i, j)∈K
(T(i, j) − (α1µ + α2x(i) + α3y( j) +
F0(i, :)G0( j, :)′))2 + λ‖F‖2f ro + λ‖G‖2f ro (4)
Notice that there is no coefficient before F0(i, :)G0( j, :)′ as it will be
automatically absorbed into F0 and G0. Once we have inferred all
the parameters (i.e., F0, G0, α1, α2, and α3) of Eq. (4), the unseen
trustworthiness score ˆT(u, v) can be immediately estimated as:
ˆT(u, v) = F0(u, :)G0(v, :)′ + α1µ + α2x(u) + α3y(v) (5)
In the above formulations, we need to specify the three types of
bias, i.e., to compute µ, x, and y. Remember that the only informa-
tion we need for MaTrust is the existing trust ratings. Therefore,
we simply estimate the bias information from T as follows:
µ =
∑
(i, j)∈K
T(i, j)/|K|
x(i) =
∑
j,(i, j)∈K
T(i, j)/|rowi| − µ
y( j) =
∑
i,(i, j)∈K
T(i, j)/|col j | − µ
(6)
where |rowi| is the number of the observed elements in the ith row
of T, and |col j | is the number of the observed elements in the jth
column of T.
4.3 Discussions and Generalizations
We further present some discussions and generalizations of our op-
timization formulation.
First, it is worth pointing out that our formulation in Eq. (1) differs
from the standard matrix factorization (e.g., SVD) as in the ob-
jective function, we try to minimize the square loss only on those
observed trust pairs. This is because the majority of trust pairs are
missing from the input trust matrix T. In this sense, our problem
setting is conceptually similar to the standard collaborative filter-
ing, as in both cases, we aim to fill in missing values in a partially
observed matrix (trustor-trustee matrix vs. user-item matrix). In-
deed, if we fix the coefficients α1 = α2 = α3 = 1 in Eq. (3), it is
reduced to the collaborative filtering algorithm in [12]. Our formu-
lation in Eq. (3) is more general as it also allows to learn the optimal
coefficients from the input trust matrix T. Our experimental eval-
uations show that such subtle treatment is crucial and it leads to
further performance improvement over these existing techniques.
Second, although our MaTrust is a subjective trust inference metric
where different trustors may form different opinions on the same
trustee [20], as a side product, the proposed MaTrust can also be
used to infer an objective, unique trustworthiness score for each
trustee. For example, this objective trustworthiness score can be
computed based on the trustee matrix G. We will compare this fea-
ture of MaTrust with a well studied objective trust inference metric
EigenTrust [11] in the experimental evaluation section.
Finally, we would like to point out that our formulation is flexible
and can be generalized to other settings. For instance, our current
formulation adopts the square loss function in the objective func-
tion. In other words, we implicitly assume that the residuals of the
pair-wise trustworthiness scores follow a Gaussian distribution, and
in our experimental evaluations, we found it works well. Nonethe-
less, our upcoming proposed MaTrust algorithm can be general-
ized to any Bregman divergence in the objective function. Also,
we can naturally incorporate some additional constraints (e.g., non-
negativity, sparseness, etc) in the trustor and trustee matrices. Af-
ter we infer all the parameters (e.g., the coefficients for the bias,
and the trustor and trustee matrices, etc), we use a linear combi-
nation (i.e., inner product) of the trustor stereotype (i.e., F(u, :))
and trustee stereotype (i.e., G(v, :)) to compute the trustworthiness
score ˆT(u, v). We can also generalize this linear form to other non-
linear combinations, such as the logistic function. For the sake of
clarity, we skip the details of such generalizations in the paper.
5. THE PROPOSED MATRUST ALGORITHM
In this section, we present the proposed algorithm to solve the Ma-
Trust trust inference problem (i.e., Eq. (4)), followed by some ef-
fectiveness and efficiency analysis.
Algorithm 1 updateMatrix(P, r). (See the appendix for the details)
Input: The n × n matrix P, and the latent factor size r
Output: The n × r trustor matrix F0, and the n × r trustee matrix
G0
1: [F0, G0] = alternatingFactorization(P, r);
2: return [F0, G0];
5.1 The MaTrust Algorithm
Unfortunately, the optimization problem in Eq. (4) is not jointly
convex wrt the coefficients (α1, α2, and α3) and the trustor/trustee
matrices (F0 and G0) due to the coupling between them. There-
fore, instead of seeking for a global optimal solution, we try to find
a local minima by alternatively updating the coefficients and the
trustor/trustee matrices while fixing the other. The alternating pro-
cedure will lead to a local optima when the convergence criteria are
met, i.e., either the L2 norm between successive estimates of both
F and G (which are equivalent to α1, α2, α3, F0, and G0) is below
our threshold ξ1 or the maximum iteration step m1 is reached.
5.1.1 Sub-routine 1: updating the trustor/trustee ma-
trices
First, let us consider how to update the trustor/trustee matrices (F0
and G0) when we fix the coefficients (α1, α2, and α3). For clarity,
we define an n × n matrix P as follows:
P(i, j) =
{
T(i, j) − (α1µ + α2x(i) + α3y( j)) if (i, j) ∈ K
‘?’ otherwise (7)
where α1, α2, and α3 are some fixed constants.
Based on the above definition, Eq. (4) can be simplified (by ignor-
ing some constant terms) as:
min
F0 ,G0
∑
(i, j)∈K
(P(i, j) − F0(i, :)G0( j, :)′)2 + λ||F0||2f ro + λ||G0||2f ro (8)
Therefore, updating the trustor/trustee matrices when we fix the co-
efficients unchanged becomes a standard matrix factorization prob-
lem for missing values. Many existing algorithms (e.g., [12, 19,
2]) can be plugged in to solve Eq.(8). In our experiment, we found
the so-called alternating strategy, where we recursively update one
of the two trustee/trustor matrices while keeping the other matrix
fixed, works best and thus recommend it in practice. A brief skele-
ton of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, and the detailed al-
gorithms are presented in the appendix for completeness.
5.1.2 Sub-routine 2: updating the coefficients
Here, we consider how to update the coefficients (α1, α2, and α3)
when we fix the trustor/trustee matrices.
If we fix the trustor and trustee matrices (F0 and G0) and let:
P(i, j) =
{
T(i, j) − F0(i, :)G0( j, :)′ if (i, j) ∈ K
‘?’ otherwise (9)
Eq. (4) can then be simplified (by dropping constant terms) as:
min
α1,α2 ,α3
∑
(i, j)∈K
(P(i, j) − (α1µ + α2x(i) + α3y( j)))2 + nλ
3∑
i=1
α2i (10)
To simplify the description, let us introduce another scalar k to in-
dex each pair (i, j) in the observed trustor-trustee pairs K , that is,
Algorithm 2 MaTrust(T, K , r, u, v).
Input: The n × n partially observed trust matrix T, the set of ob-
served trustor-trustee pairs K , the latent factor size r, trustor u,
and trustee v
Output: The estimated trustworthiness score ˆT(u, v)
1: [µ, x, y] ← computeBias(T);
2: initialize α1 = α2 = α3 = 1;
3: while not convergent do
4: for each (i, j) ∈ K do
5: P(i, j) ← T(i, j) − (α1µ + α2x(i) + α3y( j));
6: end for
7: [F0, G0] = updateMatrix(P, r);
8: for each (i, j) ∈ K do
9: P(i, j) ← T(i, j) − F0(i, :)G0( j :, )′;
10: end for
11: [α1, α2, α3]′ = updateCoefficient(P, µ, x, y);
12: end while
13: return ˆT(u, v) ← F0(u, :)G0(v, :)′ + α1µ + α2x(u) + α3y(v);
(i, j) ∈ K → k = {1, 2, ..., |K|}. Let b denote a vector of length
|K| with b(k) = P(i, j). We also define a |K| × 3 matrix A as:
A(k, 1) = µ, A(k, 2) = x(i), A(k, 3) = y( j) (k = 1, 2, ..., |K|); and a
3 × 1 vector α = [α1, α2, α3]′. Then, Eq. (10) can be formulated as
the ridge regression problem wrt the vector α:
min
α
||b − Aα||22 + nλ‖α‖2 (11)
In practice, we shrink the regularization parameter in the above
equation from nλ to λ to strengthen the importance of bias. There-
fore, we can update the coefficients as:
α = [α1, α2, α3]′ = (A′A + λI3×3)−1A′b (12)
5.1.3 Putting everything together: MaTrust
Putting everything together, we propose Algorithm 2 for our Ma-
Trust trust inference problem. The algorithm first uses Eq. (6) to
compute the global bias, trustor bias, and trustee bias (Step 1), and
initializes the coefficients (Step 2). Then the algorithm begins the
alternating procedure (Step 3-12). First, it fixes α1, α2, and α3, and
applies Eq. (7) to incorporate bias. After that, the algorithm invokes
Algorithm 1 to update the trustor matrix F0 and trustee matrix G0.
Next, the algorithm fixes F0 and G0, and uses ridge regression in
Eq. (12) to update α1, α2, and α3. The alternating procedure ends
when the stopping criteria of Eq. (4) are met. Finally, the algorithm
outputs the estimated trustworthiness from the given trustor u to the
trustee v using Eq. (5) (Step 13).
It is worth pointing out that Step 1-12 in the algorithm can be pre-
computed and their results (F0, G0, α1, α2, and α3) can be stored in
the off-line/pre-computational stage. When an on-line trust infer-
ence request arrives, MaTrust only needs to apply Step 13 to return
the inference result, which only requires a constant time.
5.2 Algorithm Analysis
Here, we briefly analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of our Ma-
Trust algorithm and provide detailed proofs in the appendix.
The effectiveness of the proposed MaTrust algorithm can be sum-
marized in Lemma 1, which says that overall, it finds a local min-
ima solution. Given that the original optimization problem in Eq. (4)
is not jointly convex wrt the coefficients (α1, α2, and α3) and the
trustor/trustee matrices (F0 and G0), such a local minima is accept-
able in practice.
LEMMA 1. Effectiveness of MaTrust. Algorithm 2 finds a lo-
cal minima for the optimization problem in Eq. (4).
PROOF. See the Appendix 
The time complexity of the proposed MaTrust is summarized in
Lemma 2, which says that MaTrust scales linearly wrt the number
of users and the number of the observed trustor-trustee pairs.
LEMMA 2. Time Complexity of MaTrust. Algorithm 2 re-
quires O(nr3m1m2 + |K|r2m1m2) time, where m1 and m2 are the
maximum iteration numbers in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1, re-
spectively.
PROOF. See the Appendix 
The space complexity of MaTrust is summarized in Lemma 3, which
says that MaTrust requires linear space wrt the number of users and
the number of the observed trustor-trustee pairs.
LEMMA 3. Space Complexity of MaTrust. Algorithm 2 re-
quires O(|K| + nr + r2) space.
PROOF. See the Appendix 
Notice that for both time complexity and space complexity, we have
a polynomial term wrt the number of the latent factors r. In prac-
tice, this parameter is small compared with the number of the users
(n) or the number of the observed trustor-trustee pairs (|K|). For
example, in our experiments, we did not observe significant per-
formance improvement when the number of latent factors is larger
than 10 (See the next section for the detailed evaluations).
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present experimental evaluations, after we intro-
duce the data sets. All the experiments are designed to answer the
following questions:
• Effectiveness: How accurate is the proposed MaTrust for
trust inference? How robust is the inference result wrt the
different parameters in MaTrust?
• Effciency: How fast is the proposed MaTrust? How does it
scale?
6.1 Data Sets Description
Many existing trust inference models design specific simulation
studies to verify the underlying assumptions of the corresponding
inference models. In contrast, we focus on two widely used real,
benchmark data sets in order to compare the performance of differ-
ent trust inference models.
The first data set is advogato1 . It is a trust-based social network
for open source developers. To allow users to certify each other,
the network provides 4 levels of trust assertions, i.e., ‘Observer’,
‘Apprentice’, ‘Journeyer’, and ‘Master’. These assertions can be
mapped into real numbers which represent the degree of trust. To
be specific, we map ‘Observer’, ‘Apprentice’, ‘Journeyer’, and ‘Mas-
ter’ to 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, and 0.9, respectively (a higher value means
more trustworthiness).
1http://www.trustlet.org/wiki/Advogato_dataset.
Table 2: High level statistics of advogato and PGP data sets.
Data set Nodes Edges Avg. degree Avg. clustering [33] Avg. diameter [15] Date
advogato-1 279 2,109 15.1 0.45 4.62 2000-02-05
advogato-2 1,261 12,176 19.3 0.36 4.71 2000-07-18
advogato-3 2,443 22,486 18.4 0.31 4.67 2001-03-06
advogato-4 3,279 32,743 20.0 0.33 4.74 2002-01-14
advogato-5 4,158 41,308 19.9 0.33 4.83 2003-03-04
advogato-6 5,428 51,493 19.0 0.31 4.82 2011-06-23
PGP 38,546 317,979 16.5 0.45 7.70 2008-06-05
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Figure 2: The distributions of trustor bias and trustee bias.
The second data set is PGP (short for Pretty Good Privacy) [8].
PGP adopts the concept of ‘web of trust’ to establish a decen-
tralized model for data encryption and decryption. Similar to ad-
vogato, the web of trust in PGP data set contains 4 levels of trust
as well. In our experiments, we also map them to 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, and
0.9, respectively.
Table 2 summarizes the basic statistics of the two resulting partially
observed trust matrices T. Notice that for the advogato data set,
it contains six different snapshots, i.e., advogato-1, advogato-2,...,
advogato-6, etc. We use the largest snapshot (i.e., advogato-6) in
the following unless otherwise specified.
Fig. 2 presents the distributions of trustor bias and trustee bias. As
we can see, many users in adovogato perform averagely on trusting
others and being trusted by others. On the other hand, a consider-
able part of PGP users are cautiously trusted by others, and even
more users tend to rate others strictly. The global bias is 0.6679
and 0.3842 for advogato and PGP, respectively. This also confirms
that the security-related PGP network is a more conservative envi-
ronment than the developer-based advogato network.
6.2 Effectiveness Results
We use both advogato (i.e., advogato-6) and PGP for effectiveness
evaluations. For both data sets, we hide a randomly selected sam-
ple of 500 observed trustor-trustee pairs as the test set, and apply
the proposed MaTrust as well as other compared methods on the
remaining data set to infer the trustworthiness scores for those hid-
den pairs. To evaluate and compare the accuracy, we report both
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Figure 3: Comparisons with subjective trust inference models.
The proposed MaTrust significantly outperforms all the other
models wrt both RMSE and MAE on both data sets.
the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the mean absolute error
(MAE) between the estimated and the true trustworthiness scores.
Both RMSE and MAE are measured on the 500 hidden pairs in
the test set. We set λ = 1.0, r = 10, m1 = 10, m2 = 100, and
ξ1 = ξ2 = 10−6 in our experiments unless otherwise specified.
(A) Comparisons with Existing Subjective Trust Inference Meth-
ods. We first compare the effectiveness of MaTrust with several
benchmark trust propagation models, including CertProp [8], Mo-
leTrust [20], Wang&Singh [31, 32], and Guha [7]. For all these
subjective methods, the goal is to infer a pair-wise trustworthiness
score (i.e., to what extent the user u trusts another user v).
The result is shown in Fig. 3. We can see that the proposed Ma-
Trust significantly outperforms all the other trust inference models
wrt both RMSE and MAE on both data sets. For example, on ad-
vogato data set, our MaTrust improves the best existing method
(CertProp) by 37.1% in RMSE and by 23.0% in MAE. As for PGP
data set, the proposed MaTrust improves the best existing method
(Wang&Singh) by 25.3% in RMSE and by 34.3% in MAE. The
Table 3: Comparisons with EigenTrust. MaTrust is better than
EigenTrust wrt both RMSE and MAE on both data sets.
RMSE/MAE advogato PGP
EigenTrust 0.700 / 0.653 0.519 / 0.371
MaTrust 0.290 / 0.203 0.349 / 0.280
Table 4: The importance of trust bias. Trust bias significantly
improves trust inference accuracy.
RMSE/MAE advogato PGP
MaTrust without trust bias 0.228 / 0.164 0.244 / 0.135
MaTrust 0.169 / 0.119 0.192 / 0.111
Table 5: Comparisons with SVD and KBV [12]. MaTrust out-
performs both of them.
RMSE/MAE advogato PGP
SVD 0.629 / 0.579 0.447 / 0.306
KBV 0.179 / 0.125 0.217 / 0.133
MaTrust 0.169 / 0.119 0.192 / 0.111
results suggest that multi-aspect of trust indeed plays a very impor-
tant role in the inference process.
(B) Comparisons with Existing Objective Trust Inference Methods.
Although our MaTrust is a subjective trust inference metric, as a
side product, it can also be used to infer an objective trustwor-
thiness score for each trustee. To this end, we set r = 1 in Ma-
Trust algorithm, and aggregate the resulting trustee matrix/vector
G0 with the bias (the global bias µ and the trustee bias y). We com-
pare the result with a widely-cited objective trust inference model
EigenTrust [11] in Table 3. As we can see, MaTrust outperforms
EigenTrust in terms of both RMSE and MAE on both data sets. For
example, on advogato data set, MaTrust is 58.6% and 68.9% better
than EigenTrust wrt RMSE and MAE, respectively.
(C) Trust Bias Evaluations. We next show the importance of trust
bias by comparing MaTrust with the results when trust bias is not
incorporated. The result is shown in Table 4. As we can see, Ma-
Trust performs much better when trust bias is incorporated. For ex-
ample, on PGP data set, trust bias helps MaTrust to obtain 21.3%
and 17.8% improvements in RMSE and MAE, respectively. This
result confirms that trust bias also plays an important role in trust
inference.
(D) Comparisons with Existing Matrix Factorization Methods. We
also compare MaTrust with two existing matrix factorization meth-
ods: SVD and the collaborative filtering algorithm [12] for recom-
mender systems (referred to as KBV).
The result is shown in Table 5. As we can see from the table,
MaTrust again outperforms both SVD and KBV on both data sets.
SVD performs poorly as it treats all the unobserved trustor-trustee
pairs as zero elements in the trust matrix T. MaTrust also out-
performs KBV. For example, MaTrust improves KBV by 11.5% in
RMSE and by 16.5% in MAE on PGP data set. As mentioned be-
fore, KBV can be viewed as a special case of the proposed MaTrust
if we fix all the coefficients as 1. This result confirms that by simul-
taneously learning the bias coefficients from the input trust matrix
T (i.e., the relative weights for different types of bias), MaTrust
leads to further performance improvement.
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Figure 4: The sensitivity evaluations. MaTrust is robust wrt
both parameters.
(E) Sensitivity Evaluations. Finally, we conduct a parametric study
for MaTrust. The first parameter is the latent factor size r. We can
observe from Fig. 4(a) that, in general, both RMSE and MAE stay
stable wrt r with a slight decreasing trend. For example, compared
with the results of r = 2, the RMSE and MAE decrease by 3.1%
and 4.3% on average if we increase r = 20. The second parameter
in MaTrust is the regularization coefficient λ. As we can see from
Fig. 4(b), both RMSE and MAE decrease when λ increases up to
0.8; and they stay stable after λ > 0.8. Based on these results,
we conclude that MaTrust is robust wrt both parameters. For all
the other results we report in the paper, we simply fix r = 10 and
λ = 1.0.
6.3 Efficiency Results
For efficiency experiments, we report the average wall-clock time.
All the experiments were run on a machine with two 2.4GHz Intel
Cores and 4GB memory.
(A) Speed Comparison. We first compare the on-line response
of MaTrust with CertProp, MoleTrust, Wang&Singh, and Guha.
Again, we use the advogato-6 snapshot and PGP in this experi-
ment, and the result is shown in Fig. 5. Notice that the y-axis is in
the logarithmic scale.
We can see from the figure that the proposed MaTrust is much faster
than all the alternative methods on both data sets. For example,
MaTrust is 2,000,000 - 3,500,000x faster than MoleTrust. This is
because once we have inferred the trustor/truestee matrices as well
as the coefficients for the bias (Step 1-12 in Algorithm 2), it only
takes constant time for MaTrust to output the trustworthiness score
(Step 13 in Algorithm 2). Among all the alternative methods, Guha
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Figure 5: Speed comparison. MaTrust is much faster than all
the other methods.
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Figure 6: Scalability of the proposed MaTrust. MaTrust scales
linearly wrt the data size (n and |K|).
is the most efficient. This is because its main workload can also
be completed in advance. However, the pre-computation of Guha
needs additional O(n2) space as the model fills nearly all the miss-
ing elements in the trust matrix, making it unsuitable for large data
sets. In contrast, MaTrust only requires O(|K| + nr + r2) space,
which is usually much smaller than n2.
(B) Scalability. Finally, we present the scalability result of Ma-
Trust by reporting the wall-clock time of the pre-computational
stage (i.e., Step 1-12 in Algorithm 2). For advogato data set, we
directly report the results on all the six snapshots (i.e., advogato-1,
..., advogato-6). For PGP, we use its subsets to study the scala-
bility. The result is shown in Fig. 6, which is consistent with the
complexity analysis in Section 5.2. As we can see from the figure,
MaTrust scales linearly wrt to both n and |K|, indicating that it is
suitable for large-scale applications.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an effective multi-aspect trust in-
ference model (MaTrust). The key idea of MaTrust is to character-
ize several aspects/factors for each trustor and trustee based on the
existing trust relationships. The proposed MaTrust can naturally in-
corporate the prior knowledge such as trust bias by expressing it as
specified factors. In addition, MaTrust scales linearly wrt the input
data size (e.g., the number of users, the number of observed trustor-
trustee pairs, etc). Our experimental evaluations on real data sets
show that trust bias can truly improve the inference accuracy, and
that MaTrust significantly outperforms existing benchmark trust in-
ference models in both effectiveness and efficiency. Future work
includes investigating the capability of MaTrust to address the dis-
trust as well as the trust dynamics.
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APPENDIX
A. DETAILED ALGORITHM 1
Here, we present the complete algorithm to update the trustor/trustee
matrices when the bias coefficients are fixed (i.e., Algorithm 1 for
Eq. (8)). As mentioned above, we apply the alternating strategy
by alternatively fixing one of the two matrices and optimizing the
other. For simplicity, let us consider how to update F0 when G0 is
fixed. Updating G0 when F0 is fixed can be done in a similar way.
By fixing G0, Eq. (8) can be further simplified as follows:
min
F0
∑
(i, j)∈K
(P(i, j) − F0(i, :)G0( j, :)′)2 + λ||F0||2f ro (13)
In fact, the above optimization problem in Eq. (13) now becomes
convex wrt F0. It can be further decoupled into many independent
sub-problems, each of which only involves a single row in F0:
min
F0(i,:)
∑
j,(i, j)∈K
(P(i, j) − F0(i, :)G0( j, :)′)2 + λ||F0(i, :)||2 (14)
The optimization problem in Eq. (14) can now be solved by the
standard ridge regression wrt the corresponding row F0(i, :).
Algorithm 3 alternateUpdate(P, F0,G0).
Input: The n × n matrix P, the n × r matrix F0, and the fixed n × r
matrix G0
Output: The updated matrix F1 of F0
1: F1 ← F0;
2: for i = 1 : n do
3: a ← the vector of column indices of existing elements in
P(i, j) ( j = 1, 2, ..., n);
4: column vector d ← 0|a|×1;
5: matrix G1 ← 0|a|×r;
6: for j = 1: |a| do
7: d( j) ← P(i, a( j));
8: G1( j, :) ← G0(a( j), :);
9: end for
10: F1(i, :) ← (G′1G1 + λ · Ir×r)−1G′1d;
11: end for
12: return F1;
Algorithm 3 presents the overall solution for updating the trustor
matrix F0. Based on Algorithm 3, we present Algorithm 4 to al-
ternatively update the trustor and trustee matrices F0 and G0. The
algorithm first generates two n × r matrices for F0 and G0 where
each element is initialized as 1/r. At each iteration, the algorithm
then alternatively calls Algorithm 3 to update the two matrices. The
iteration ends when the stopping criteria are met, i.e., either the L2
norm between successive estimates of both F0 and G0 is below our
threshold ξ2 or the maximum iteration step m2 is reached.
Algorithm 4 updateMatrix(P, r).
Input: The n × n matrix P, and the latent factor size r
Output: The n × r trustor matrix F0, and the n × r trustee matrix
G0
1: generate the n × r matrices F0 and G0 randomly;
2: while not convergent do
3: F0 ← alternateUpdate(P, F0, G0);
4: G0 ← alternateUpdate(P′, G0, F0);
5: end while
6: return [F0, G0];
B. PROOFS FOR LEMMAS
Next, we present the proofs for the lemmas in Section 5.2.
Proof Sketch for Lemma 1: (P1) First, Eq. (14) is convex and
therefore Step 10 in Algorithm 3 finds the global optima for up-
dating a single row in the matrix F0. Notice that the optimization
problem in Eq. (14) is equivalent to that in Eq. (13), and thus we
have proved that Algorithm 3 finds the global optimal solution for
the optimization problem in Eq. (13).
(P2) Next, based on (P1) and the alternating procedure in Algo-
rithm 4, we have that Algorithm 4 finds a local minima for the
optimization problem in Eq. (8).
(P3) Finally, based on (P2) and the alternating procedure in Algo-
rithm 2, Lemma 1 holds. 
Proof of Lemma 2: (P1) In Algorithm 3, the time cost for Step 1 is
O(nr). Let ai denote the number of elements in a of the ith iteration.
The time cost for Step 3-5 is then O(air) since we store P in sparse
format. We need another O(air) time in the inner iteration (Step 6-
9). The time cost of Step 10 is O(air2 + r2 + r3 + air2 + air + r) =
O(r3 + air2). Therefore, the total time cost for the algorithm is
O(nr) + O(∑i(r3 + air2)) = O(nr3 + |K|r2) where ∑i ai = |K|.
(P2) In Algorithm 4, the time cost for Step 1 is O(nr). As indicated
by (P1), we need O(nr3 + |K|r2) time for both Step 3 and Step 4.
The total time cost is O(nr3m2 + |K|r2m2).
(P3) In Algorithm 2, the time cost for Step 1 is O(|K|) as we store T
in sparse format. Step 2 needs O(1) time. We need O(|K|) time for
Step 4-6. As indicated by (P2), we need O(nr3m2 + |K|r2m2) time
for Step 7. We need O(|K|r) time for Step 8-10. As for updating the
coefficients, we need O(|K|c2 + c3) time where c is the number of
specified factors, which is 3 in our case. Therefore, the time cost for
Step 11 is O(|K|). The total time cost is O(nr3m1m2 + |K|r2m1m2),
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3: (P1) In Algorithm 3, we need O(nr) space for
Step 1 and O(1) space for Step 2. We need another O(nr) space for
Step 3-5. For Step 6-9 we only need O(1) space. We need O(nr+r2)
space for Step 10. Among the different iterations of the algorithm,
we can re-use the space from the previous iteration. Finally, the
overall space cost is O(|K| + nr + r2).
(P2) In Algorithm 4, we need O(nr) space for Step 1. Step 3 and
Step 4 need O(|K|+nr+ r2) space. The space for each iteration can
be re-used. The total space cost is O(|K| + nr + r2).
(P3) In Algorithm 2, we need O(|K|) space for the input since we
store T in sparse format. We need O(n) space for Step 1 and O(1)
space for the Step 2. We need another O(|K|) space for Step 4-
6. By (P2), Step 7 needs O(|K| + nr + r2) space. Step 8-10 can
re-use the space from Step 4-6. Step 11 needs O(|K|) space. For
each iteration, the space can be re-used. The total space cost of
Algorithm 2 is O(|K| + nr + r2), which completes the proof. 
